Entrapped: John Nuttall, Amanda Korody, and Canada's Counterterrorism Crisis 

BY Basema Al-Alami
October 2024

Imagine a young couple—John and Amanda—struggling to rebuild their lives on the margins of society. John, once obsessed with neo-Nazism and Satanism, finds peace in punk music. Amanda, his partner, shares his journey through addiction and poverty. Together, they live on welfare in a modest home in Vancouver, British Columbia, searching for meaning and community.

Their search leads them to convert to Islam—a decision that does not bring spiritual fulfillment but instead draws the attention of law enforcement. John’s vocal anger at global injustices against Muslims puts him on the radar of authorities. What begins as an attempt to find peace becomes the pretext for relentless surveillance.

This is not a story from fiction. 

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This is the story of how the Canadian government orchestrated the entrapment of two vulnerable people—John Nuttall and Amanda Korody—and how their case exposed the dangerous consequences of our country’s counterterrorism tactics (Baker, 2022).

In Canada, entrapment occurs (a) when law enforcement provides an opportunity to commit an offence without a reasonable suspicion that the individual was already engaged in criminal activity, or (2) when law enforcement goes beyond merely providing an opportunity and induces the commission of the offence (Mack, 1988).

Canada’s counterterrorism tactics, exemplified by the elaborate entrapment operation in the Nuttall case, illustrate a dangerous slide toward the over-policing of Muslim communities. This trend is further supported by a media narrative that perpetuates anti-Muslim bias and exaggerates the perceived threat posed by this group.

The Story: Manufacturing Terrorists 

The escalation with law enforcement began when John’s neighbour reported overhearing John discussing explosive devices. Shortly after, a man from their mosque claimed that John had boasted about fictitious acts of violence. After a preliminary investigation, law enforcement agencies concluded that John and Amanda posed no actual threat, and the claims of violence were mere fantasy (Berman, 2022).

Despite these findings, in early 2013, law enforcement, led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), launched the expansive Project Souvenir, a sting operation aimed at entrapping John and Amanda. The operation was set in motion after the RCMP received a tip from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), stating that John, a recent convert to Islam, had been espousing jihadist ideas and had allegedly purchased potassium nitrate, a component used in explosives, from a local pharmacy (Nuttall, 2016).

However, as per the court’s finding, the CSIS tip was unverified and lacked substantial details (Nuttall, 2016). Surveillance cameras set up outside John and Amanda’s home revealed no suspicious activity and no evidence of criminal plotting. Despite this, the RCMP proceeded with Project Souvenir, intensifying the operation rather than reassessing the lack of threat.

This marked a dark turning point in the case.

In March 2013, “Uncle Abe” appeared—an undercover RCMP officer posing as a sympathetic friend. Abe provided groceries, money, and spiritual advice, gradually embedding himself in the couple’s lives. He fueled John’s anger and fantasies of vengeance. Although John had expressed violent fantasies, law enforcement ultimately concluded that he posed no actual threat, as his behavior had never escalated beyond speech or fantasy before law enforcement intervention. (Nuttall, 2016). 

By Canada Day in July 2013, John and Amanda placed what they believed to be explosives at the British Columbia Legislature, only to be arrested immediately after (Luk, 2014). The bombs were inert, part of the RCMP’s fabricated plot. 

Ultimately, the proceedings in the case were stayed by the Supreme Court of British Columbia, which concluded that the police had manufactured the crime of terrorism. This decision was later upheld by the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The Construction of the Enemy

The elaborate sting operation in the Nuttall case is not an anomaly. In fact, there have been 62 terrorism prosecutions in Canada to date, with just over half resulting in convictions (Nesbitt et al., 2023). Most of these cases have been resolved, yet they reveal a troubling pattern. Legal scholars have noted that terrorism prosecutions disproportionately target Muslims, raising concerns about over-policing of Muslim communities and under-policing of far-right groups.

This discrepancy between how Muslims and far-right extremists are treated under Canada's national security framework is not speculative; it is well-documented. Muslims are not only more likely to experience intense police scrutiny but are also less likely to receive protection from law enforcement when targeted by hate crimes (Roach, 2023). This dynamic contributes to a broader pattern of constructing Muslims as the “enemy” within national security discourse.

Take, for example, the 2017 Quebec City mosque shooting. A 27-year-old white man entered the mosque during evening prayers, armed with a semi-automatic rifle and a Glock pistol. He killed six men and critically injured five more in a mere two minutes (Nerestant, 2022). The attacker, motivated by white supremacist beliefs and angered by Canada’s acceptance of migrants from Muslim-majority countries, was charged with first-degree murder but not under terrorism provisions. Even though the law, as amended, allows for first-degree murder charges on the basis of terrorist activity, the attacker was never labeled a terrorist. 

Similarly, in June 2021, a 23-year-old white man, motivated by anti-Muslim hatred, drove a pickup truck into a Muslim family in London, Ontario, killing four and leaving a 9-year-old boy as the sole survivor. The RCMP’s initial press release labeled the incident a “vehicle attack,” downplaying the terrorist motive (Canadian Press, 2021). While terrorism charges were eventually added, their delayed timing raises concerns that they were more symbolic and responding to external pressures rather than substantive. The contrast in how late these charges were brought, compared to the sweeping terrorism accusations made against Muslim suspects, is glaring. 

These tragedies are not isolated. Between 2001, when Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) introduced terrorism offences, and 2019, not a single far-right extremist in Canada was charged with terrorism, even though far-right violence claimed more lives domestically than Al-Qaida-inspired extremism during that same period (Roach, 2021). In contrast, terrorism charges disproportionately targeted Muslims, even in cases where no credible threat existed.

The Nuttall case exemplifies this pattern of over-policing. Despite a lack of evidence and warnings from legal advisors about creating a “police-generated crime,” the RCMP pressed forward with Project Souvenir. Surveillance cameras installed outside John and Amanda’s home showed no suspicious behavior. The couple stayed close to their residence, playing video games and paintball. Yet, the RCMP persisted, staging 28 undercover scenarios over five months. The operation escalated, not because of any credible threat, but due to an anonymous, unverified tip from CSIS. 

The question remains: why did the RCMP proceed? The answer likely lies in a combination of inaccurate intelligence, discriminatory tips, and orientalist assumptions that conflate Muslimness with terrorism. Testimony from the Nuttall trial reveals that the risk of entrapment was raised early on in the investigation. One corporal even expressed concerns that if the RCMP paid John, he would commit any crime they wanted. Notes from a sergeant’s briefing included passages from R v Mack, the leading case on entrapment law in Canada, yet the RCMP continued undeterred (Nuttall, 2016).

In fact, John’s proposals were, at best, grandiose fantasies—such as hijacking a nuclear submarine to hold the world hostage. Yet the RCMP chose to pursue a sting operation, spending over $1 million in overtime pay for 150 Mounties, rather than reevaluating the case's merit (FIPA, 2016). The aftermath played out like a carefully orchestrated PR campaign, with the RCMP claiming they had foiled a terrorist plot, while the media painted John and Amanda as dangerous radicals (CBC A, 2013). The reality is that their story was one of entrapment, not ideological extremism.

Image by Nick Amaya